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Abstract
Those who are risk averse with respect to money, and thus turn down
some gambles with positive monetary expectations, are neverthe-
less often willing to accept bundles involving multiple such gambles.
Therefore, it might seem that such people should become more will-
ing to accept a risky but favourable gamble if they put it in context
with the collection of gambles that they predict they will be faced with
in the future. However, it turns out that when a risk averse person
adopts the long-term perspective, she faces a decision-problem that
can be analysed as a noncooperative game between different “time-
slices” of herself, where it is in the interest of each time-slice (given
its prediction about other slices) to turn down the gamble with which
it is faced. Hence, even if a risk averse but rational person manages
to take the long-term perspective, she will, in the absence of what
Hardin called “mutual coercion”, end up in a situation analogous to
the “tragedy of the commons”.
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1 Introduction
Imagine being offered a 50-50 gamble between winning $2,000 and losing
$1,000. Would you accept the offer? If you are risk averse, as many people
are (even when relatively little is at stake), then the answer might be “no”.
The risk of losing $1,000 is simply not worth an equal chance of gaining
$2,000. What if instead you were offered a bundle consisting of n such
gambles? If you believe that the chance that each gamble results in a
win is independent of the outcomes of the other gambles, then there will
presumably be some (finite) n such that you would accept the bundle,
even though you turned down the single gamble. After all, since each
gamble has a positive monetary expectation, probabilistic independence
between the outcomes of the gambles means that as n becomes larger, the
probability that the bundle results in a monetary loss becomes arbitrarily
small while the expected monetary return becomes arbitrarily large.
An attitude like that described above, that is, a preference (at any level of
wealth) against a particular gamble combined with a preference in favour
of a bundle consisting of some finite number of such gambles, is known
to be inconsistent with expected utility theory, as the theory is typically
formulated1 (Samuelson 1963).2 So, those who believe that the theory cor-
rectly captures the requirements of instrumental rationality should think
that the combined preference is irrational. In contrast, those who favour
alternatives to expected utility theory that can account for attitudes like
that described above—for instance, those who favour “risk-weighted” ex-
pected utility theory (Buchak 2013)—might take the combined preference
to support their favoured theory.3
Although I believe that the combined preference is rationally permissi-
ble, I shall not in this paper argue that it is.4 Instead, I address a puzzle that
1That is, assuming that utilities are defined on terminal outcomes rather than changes.
2More precisely, the attitude in question is inconsistent with a combination of Transi-
tivity and Event-Wise Dominance (Stefánsson 2018), given the assumption mentioned in
the last footnote.
3Note however that Thoma (2019) has argued that in fact, risk-weighted expected
utility theory cannot account for the attitude under discussion. Since may aim in this
paper is not to discuss the advantages of different decision theories I will not discuss
further which theories can, and which cannot, account for the attitude in question.
4For recent discussions of the rational permissibility of the attitude under discussion,
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arises for those of us who believe that the attitude in question is rationally
permissible.
The puzzle derives its practical force from the fact that although most
of us are not fortunate enough to be repeatedly offered simple gambles like
those discussed above, we are repeatedly faced with more complex inde-
pendent “gambles”—that is, risky prospects—with positive objective5 ex-
pectations. That is, throughout the course of our lives, we face many gam-
bles that have some chance of resulting in a desirable outcome and some
risk of resulting in an undesirable outcome, where for each gamble, the
probability weighted desirable quantity (e.g. money won, or lives saved)
outweighs the probability weighted undesirable quantity (e.g. money or
lives lost). So, if one has a combination of preference like that discussed
above, then although one might be tempted to reject a gamble when consid-
ered in isolation, one might be willing to accept the gamble when viewed
in the context of the gambles that one predicts one will be faced with in the
future. In other words, whether one accepts a gamble might then depend
on whether one takes the long-term or the short-term perspective.6
An important ingredient in the said puzzle, is the assumption that
it is typically unreasonable, perhaps even irrational, to take the short-
term perspective. It is more or less uncontroversial that when framing
a decision-problem, one should include everything that might affect the
values of, and thus the choice between, the available options. Therefore,
if the gambles that one believes one will be faced with in the future affect
the values of one’s current options, then one should take this into account,
when deciding what choice to make in one’s current situation. But if one
accepts this line of reasoning, then it might seem that it is not rationally
permissible to turn down the gambles that one would accept if one were to
take the long-term perspective.7
see e.g. Buchak (2013), Stefánsson (2018) and Thoma (2019).
5By a gamble with a positive objective expectation, I mean for instance a bet with a
positive monetary expectation, or a public policy whose expected number of lives saved
is positive, etc. Such gambles can however of course have a negative expected utility
(compared to their alternatives, e.g. the status quo).
6For evidence that the long vs. short-term perspective affects actual decision-makers’
willingness to accept gambles, see e.g. Thaler et.al. (1997).
7It might be worth emphasizing that whenever I speak of “rationality” in this paper,
I have in mind the (thin) conception of instrumental rationality, according to which no
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In sum, the puzzle consists in the seeming tension between the follow-
ing claims. First, one can rationally permissibly turn down a gamble when
viewed in isolation, even though one would accept it if viewed as part of
the collection of gambles that one predicts one will be faced with in the
future. Second, when evaluating a gamble, one (rationally) should include
everything that is relevant to the gamble’s choice-worthiness, including
the gambles that one predicts one will be faced with in the future. From
the second claim it seems to follow that if one would accept a particular
gamble when one has taken into account one’s beliefs about the future,
then it is not rationally permissible to turn down the gamble. But how is
that consistent with the first claim?
The aim of this paper is respond to the above puzzle. I shall argue that
even if one is rationally required to take into account one’s beliefs about
the future when evaluating a gamble, a rational person may well turn
down a gamble that they would accept if it were offered as part of a bundle
consisting of the gambles that the person predicts she will be offered in
the future. In fact, I shall argue that for a minimally rational person with
preferences like those under discussion, it makes no difference whether
she takes the long-term or the short-term perspective when evaluating the
individual gamble; she will turn it down either way. Hence, contrary to
a worry recently raised by Thoma (2019), we can predict the choices of a
minimally rational person with the preferences under discussion even if
we do not know which of these perspectives the person takes.
My argument relies on the assumption that one can only determinately
choose for one’s current self; for instance, gambles that a person will be
offered in the future are not, strictly speaking, options for her today. I shall
argue that it follows from this assumption (which I spell out in section 3),
that a person with the combined attitude under discussion at some points
in time faces a type of Prisoner’s Dilemma between different “time-slices”
of herself. And as in the interpersonal version of multiplayer Prisoner’s
Dilemma, there is, in the absence of an external constraint, only one ra-
tionalisable outcome of an intrapersonal version of the game, namely, a
individual preference is (ir)rational per se, even though some combinations of attitudes and
certain combinations of attitudes and actions are (ir)rational. (I am grateful to Alexander
Heape for making me see the need to add this clarification.)
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“tragedy of the commons” (Lloyd 1833, Hardin 1968) where each time-
slice turns down the individual gamble with which it is faced.8
I end the paper with some brief remarks on my most important assump-
tion about rational sequential choice, that is, my assumption that rational
people are not what has been called “resolute” choosers. In particular, I
argue that if one takes seriously the game-theoretic analysis of the puzzle
under discussion, then that provides at least some reason to assume that
rational people with the preference structure in question are not resolute.
2 Samuelson’s colleague
The problem of interest is how risk averse agents should choose, when
offered a gamble (i.e., risky prospect) with a positive objective (e.g., mon-
etary) expectation that they have a preference against when considered in
isolation, but that they would accept if offered as part of the collection of
gambles that they predict they will be faced with in the future. To keep
things simple, I will model this problem with help of the example that
Paul Samuelson (1963) used when stating his “fallacy of large numbers”.
Samuelson told a story of a “distinguished” colleague of his, who turned
down an offer of a single 50-50 gamble between gaining $200 and losing
$100, while confessing his willingness to accept a bundle consisting of 100
such (independent) gambles—which would indeed be a very attractive
offer, carrying only about a 0.04% risk of losing money and having an ex-
pectation of $5,000. Since slightly smaller bundles will be very attractive
too, I will assume that there is some n < 100 such that the colleague would
prefer to enlarge the size of the bundle once the number of gambles in the
bundle have reached n.
As Samuelson proved, the preferences of his colleague—whom I shall
henceforth refer to as SC—cannot be represented as maximising expected
utility, as traditionally defined (see fn. 1).9 To prove SC’s inconsistency
8Buchak (2013: 222) briefly points out that the puzzle that I shall discuss bears some
similarities to Prisoner’s Dilemma, without analysing the similarity further.
9Moreover, as Stefánsson (2018) shows, building on work by Tversky and Bar-Hillel
(1983), SC’s combined attitude violates either Acyclicity—which states that if A is pre-
ferred to B and B is preferred to C then C is not preferred to A—or Event-Wise Dominance—
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with expected utility theory, Samuelson made an assumption that I shall
make too, namely, that SC would turn down the single gamble even if his
wealth increased or decreased by the maximum that one can gain ($19,800)
or lose ($9,900) from the first 99 gambles in the bundle. More generally,
it will be assumed that the possible outcomes of the bundles that we are
considering will not reverse the preferences towards the corresponding
individual gambles.
By the reasoning explained in the introductory section, we seem to have
the following argument that SC should take the long-term perspective.
Suppose that SC gets the 100 gambles offered sequentially, that he knows
this, and that he moreover learns the outcome of the previous gamble
before being offered the next gamble.10 Then if he at each choice point acts
according to the preference he has at that point, he will turn down every
gamble. However, if SC evaluates each gamble in light of the gambles that
he predicts he will be later faced with, then he might ask himself whether
he prefers, in the long-run, to acquire a smaller or a larger set of gambles,
rather than asking himself whether he prefers to accept or reject the gamble
on offer at each point in time. In that case, it might seem that he would
accept each gamble, which he prefers to rejecting all gambles. Hence, it
might seem that SC should frame the decision in terms of the long-run,
since that way he acquires a bundle that he (ex ante) prefers to the “empty
bundle” that he ends up choosing with the short-term framing.
So, the puzzle that is the topic of this paper can be formulated as
follows. It would seem that instrumentally rational decision-makers, that
is, decision-makers who make the choices that they expect to best satisfy
their interests, will choose to formulate each decision-problem in terms of
the long-run rather than in terms of the short-run. That seems to imply that
an instrumentally rational decision-maker will not turn down an individual
gamble if she would accept it as part of the collection of gambles that she
which implies that if there is a partition of the state space such that one gamble is (weakly)
preferred to another gamble conditional on every event in the partition, then the first gam-
ble should be (weakly) preferred to the second.
10If SC does not learn the outcome of the last gamble in a sequence before being offered
the next gamble, then the decision he is faced with is a choice between a smaller and a
larger bundle of gambles, as I shall interpret it, rather than a choice between accepting
and rejecting an individual gamble.
6
predicts she will be faced with in the long-run. But how is that consistent
with SC’s preferences—that is, a preference against the single gamble but
in favour of a bundle of 100 such gambles—being rationally permissible?
3 The impossibility of choosing for others
Let us look closer at the question of how SC should approach the decision
about the 50-50 gamble between winning $200 and losing $100 that he is
being offered now, assuming that he believes that he will be offered many
more bets like this in the future, and assuming that he prefers accepting all
of these gambles to accepting none of them.
As previously discussed, it is natural to think that to be instrumentally
rational, SC must include anything that matters to the evaluation of the
gamble when deliberating about whether to accept it or not. In particular,
he should include information about the gambles that he predicts he will
be offered. Let’s accept this claim, at least for the sake of the argument. So,
SC is required to take the “long-term perspective”, when evaluating the
gamble that he is now faced with.
How would taking the long-term perspective, rather than the short-
term perspective, affect SC’s current decision, that is, the decision between
accepting and rejecting a single 50-50 gamble between winning $200 and
losing $100? In the last section, we saw an argument that may have
suggested that this difference in perspective makes SC accept rather than
reject the gamble with which he is now faced. However, in the next section
I shall argue that, perhaps surprisingly, he will, if rational, turn down the
single gamble irrespective of whether he takes the long-term or the short-
term perspective. But since there is nothing special about the gamble that
he is currently faced with, it follows that he will turn down all such gambles
that he will be offered in the future too. So, even if SC takes the long-term
perspective, he will turn down all the gambles, even though he prefers the
bundle of 100 gambles to no gamble at all.
The argument in the next section relies on the following pair of con-
ceptually related by logically independent assumptions, that I shall spell
out in the remainder of this section. First, the fact that a person, at a time
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previous to t, intends to make a particular choice C when it comes to time
t, does not make it impossible for the person to not make choice C when it
comes to time t.11 In other words, intending to perform a particular act at
a later time t is consistent with not performing that act at time t. Second, to
determinately choose, as we might put it, is something that one can only do
for one’s current self. One can intend for one’s future self to make certain
choices. And one can even prevent one’s future self—or indeed someone
else—from choosing an option, by making that option unavailable. But
one cannot determinately choose for one’s future self, nor for others. I
leave open the possibility that one can in some sense chose for one’s future
self (and perhaps even for others); but that sense of choosing should then
be kept distinct from what I call “determinate choosing”.
For instance, if I today tell a conference organiser that I would like
the vegan dish at the conference dinner two weeks form now, then I am
not determinately choosing the vegan option for my future self, given my
terminology. Rather, I am choosing to limit the options of my future self
in a particular way; for instance, by making it impossible for my future
self to have a non-vegan dish without causing some trouble. In contrast,
that my future self has the vegan dish is not an option for me today (cf.
Hedden 2012). Similarly, when choosing between different types of coffee
to bring your colleague from a cafe, you are not determinately choosing
for the colleague, given my terminology. Rather, you are choosing how to
limit your colleague’s options.
Coming back to SC, it follows from the above way of understanding
“to determinately choose”, that he cannot determinately choose now to
accept some gamble that he will be offered in the future. He can at most
determinately choose to accept or reject the gamble with which he is faced
now.12 Moreover, the fact that he now intends to accept some future gamble
does not make it impossible for him to turn down the gamble when the
11Note that this assumption is consistent with Michael Bratman’s (1987) influential
account of intentions, according to which an intention to make a particular choice includes
a commitment to make that choice. After all, even such a commitment is defeasible.
12How should we understand “now” and “current” (in “current self”)? That is a
problem for the metaphysician, that I will not try to solve here. However, I contend that
we have an intuitive notion of “now” and “current” that suffices to make plausible the
claim that we can only determinately choose between options with which we are now
faced, that is, options with which our current self is faced.
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time arrives. And that is true even if he takes the long-term perspective,
that is, even if he formulates his decision-problem by taking into account
the fact that he predicts he will be offered multiple such gambles in the
future. These future gambles are not options for SC today. Now, recall
our above assumption that SC prefers to accept more rather than fewer of
these future gambles. That means that SC now hopes that he will choose
more rather than fewer of these future gambles. He might even now intend
to accept these future gambles. But that does not mean that SC can now
determinately choose more rather than fewer of these future gambles.
At the risk of being drawn into the muddy waters of the metaphysics
of personal identity, we can formulate the above point by using the notion
of a time-slice of a person. But my argument does not, I hope, depend on
any particular stance on the metaphysics of personal identity. Nor does
my argument depend on what Hedden (2015) calls time-slice rationality.
That is, my argument is consistent with there being diachronic rationality
requirements, as long as they do not at any time t trump the requirements
of instrumental rationality that stem from what a person prefers at t. For
instance, my argument is consistent with Bayesian conditionalization be-
ing a diachronic norm of belief change. My argument is of course also
consistent with it being rationally permissible, and even consistent with
it being rationally required, to consider one’s life-time well-being when
deliberating about a decision. But my argument is not consistent with, say,
it being a general requirement of instrumental rationality that one makes
some particular choice at time t whenever, and because, one hoped (or in-
tended), at some point previous to t, that one would make that choice at
time t.
Despite the above caveats, it should be evident that we can (metaphor-
ically!) slice SC up however we like.13 In particular, we can slice SC up
into 100 time-slices, each slice corresponding to a gamble that he predicts
he will be be offered. Then we can formulate the observations from the
preceding paragraphs as follows: Although SC’s current time-slice prefers
13This might suggest that no (or hardly any) choices are ever available to us, since
following through on any (or at least most) choice(s) takes some time. I believe that this
boils down to the same issue as that raised in footnote 12, namely, the question of the
maximum possible time-length of “current” in current self—which is an issue that I shall
not try to resolve here.
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to reject the gamble that it is offered, it nevertheless hopes that more rather
than fewer of the future time-slices accept the gambles that they will be
offered. And the same is true of all the other time-slices. However, each
time-slice can only choose to accept or reject the gamble that it is offered.
4 An intrapersonal noncooperative game
Although each time-slice can only choose for itself, as I argued in the last
section, each slice nevertheless should, when reasoning about the gamble
with which it is faced, take into account the fact that other time-slices will
be faced with gambles of the same type. After all, one should in general
take the long-term perspective when formulating a decision-problem—or
so we are at least assuming, for the sake of the argument—which implies,
given the current formulation of SC’s decision-problem, that each time-slice
should take into account the possible actions of other, future time-slices.
But how should each time-slice reason about its gamble given the gam-
bles that other time-slices will be offered? Since each time-slice cannot
determine how the other time-slices will act, each time-slice should ask
itself what it would prefer to do given each of the possible combinations
of actions available to future time-slices. In other words, each time-slice
should frame its decision-problem as a noncooperative game with the other
time-slices.
To analyse more formally SC’s decision-problem as a noncooperative
game, let us start with some formal definitions and stipulations.14 I shall
continue to assume that SC will be offered 100 gambles sequentially and
that we have divided SC into 100 corresponding time-slices; let’s now
denote these SC1, SC2, ..., SC100. Let≺i be the preference relation of slice SCi.15
SC’s wealth before the start of the sequence of offered bets is denoted w;
before the final round of the sequence, SC’s wealth will be in the interval
[w − $9, 900,w + $19, 800]; let w∗ be a random variable in this interval. Let
≺
i
w∗ denote SCi’s preference given (or on the assumption that SC has) wealth
14I am particularly grateful to a referee and the handling editor for very useful sugges-
tions that helped me clarify the following argument.
15For the present purposes, the domain of ≺i can be very limited, only containing the
decision to accept and the decision to reject the gamble with which SCi is faced.
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w∗. Ai is the decision (by SCi) to accept gamble number i; R j the decision
(by SC j) to reject gamble number j. Finally, let An mean that n gambles
will be accepted (but have not been resolved), and let ≺i
An
stand for SCi’s
preference relation given that n future bets will be accepted.
We assume that the time-slices all have the same preference when it
comes to any decision to accept or reject some particular gamble given
any specified level of wealth, corresponding to the assumption that SC’s
preference remains unchanged throughout the sequence. In particular, as
the reader will recall, we have been assuming that for any SCi and for any
w∗ ∈ [w − $9, 900,w + $19, 800]:
Ai ≺iw∗ Ri (1)
Less formally, each time-slices of SC prefers to turn down the gamble with
which it is faced, when it considers that gamble only. We can think of the
claim in (1) as formally capturing the assumption that SC prefers to turn
down any individual gamble when he takes the short-term perspective.
However, we have also assumed that there is some n ∈ [1, 99], such that
for any i ∈ [1, 100] and for any w∗ ∈ [w − $9, 900,w + $19, 800]:
Ri ≺iw∗,Am≥n Ai (2)
In other words, given that sufficiently many gambles will be accepted,
each time-slice of SC prefers to accept the gamble with which it is faced
(irrespective of SC’s wealth).
Now, for claim (1) to make any sense given claim (2), it would seem
that there also has to be some n ∈ [0, 99] such that for any SCi and for any
w∗ ∈ [w − $9, 900,w + $19, 800]:
Ai ≺iw∗,Am≤n Ri (3)
That is, there is some number n such that any time-slice will (irrespective
of SC’s wealth) prefer to turn down the gamble with which it is faced given
that no more than n future gambles will be accepted.
In particular, we have been assuming (as did Samuelson in his original
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argument) that for any SCi and for any w∗ ∈ [w − $9, 900,w + $19, 800]:
Ai ≺iw∗,A0 Ri (4)
That is, given that no future gambles will be accepted, a time-slice prefers to
turn down the gamble with which it is faced (irrespective of SC’s wealth).
From the claim in (2) it follows that if SC1 is convinced that, say, all
remaining 99 time-slices will accept—more generally, if SC1 is convinced
that sufficiently many will accept—then SC1 will also prefer to accept.
However, from (4) it follows that, no matter what the first 99 time-slices
choose, and no matter the outcomes of any potential earlier bets, SC100 will
prefer to reject. Assuming that SC99 foresees the preference of its successor,
and believes that the successor will act on its preference (more on which in
the next section), SC99 will also prefer to reject the gamble with which it is
faced. But the same applies then to SC98, and so on, all the way to SC1.
In sum, we have seen that, although by (2), there are beliefs that SC1 in
principle could hold such that it would prefer to accept, nevertheless by
backward-inductive reasoning, SC1 will prefer to reject, and so will all other
time-slices of SC.
We can now see that for the last time-slice, the noncooperative game
in question has the payoff structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. And the
same is true of some other “late” time-slices.16 In contrast, for the first
time-slice, the noncooperative game in question does not have the payoff
structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. And the same is true of some other
“early” time-slices. (It might be worth emphasising that which time-slices
count as “late”, and which count as “early”—that is, which time-slices face
a game with the payoff structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma and which do
not—is irrelevant for the conclusion, as long as the very last slice faces a
game with this payoff structure.)
To illustrate the above two claims, let us consider the situation of a
single time-slice under the simplifying assumption that the other time-
16I should note that the game itself is however somewhat different from standard
formulations of multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma. In particular, players in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma always act without (perfect) information about simultaneous action of some other
player. The same is not true of the different time-slice of SC, since they always act one at
a time.
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slices all act in the same way, that is, we assume for now that the other
time-slices either all accept or all reject the gambles that they are offered.
The below table represents such a situation. The numbers in the cells
are ordinal utilities, that is, they represent how the time-slice in question
orders the bundles of gambles in terms of preferability, but they need not
correspond to how much the time-slice prefers one bundle over another; the
variables, n and m, denote ordinal utilities too.
Others accept Others reject
Accept m > n 1
Reject 2 n > 1
Table: Each time-slice’s decision-problem
The outcome represented by ‘2’ is one where the time-slice whose
decision-problem is being represented rejects the gamble with which it
is faced while all the other 99 time-slices accept their gambles. The out-
come represented by ‘1’ is one where the time-slice in question accepts the
gamble with which it faced while all the other 99 time-slices reject their
gambles. The outcome represented by ‘m’ is one where the time-slice in
question accepts the gamble with which it is faced and so do all the other
99 time-slices. Finally, the outcome represented by ‘n’ is one where the
time-slice whose decision-problem is being represented rejects the gamble
with which it is faced and so do all the other time-slices.
Note that the table leaves open the relationship between ‘2’ and ‘m’.
In fact, the relationship is different depending on which time-slice we are
considering. From the assumption formalised by (2), it follows that if
the time-slice in question is SC1 (or perhaps some other “early” time-slice),
then m > 2. That is, given that the other time slices will accept their gambles,
SC1 prefers to do so too. In contrast, by the assumption formalised by (4),
it follows that if the time slice in question is SC100, then m < 2. For even if
the earlier time-slices have accepted their gambles, SC100 prefers to reject. So,
for SC100 (and perhaps some other “late” slices), the game has the payoff
structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Now, since SC100 prefers to reject the gamble even if the other slices
accept, and assuming that SC1 reasons backward-inductively (an assump-
tion we shall get back to in the next section) and moreover believes that all
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slices act on their preferences, SC1 believes that it will only get to choose
between ‘1’ and ‘n’ (that is, it believes it will find itself in the ‘Others reject’
column). So, the relationship between ‘2’ and ‘m’ ends up playing no role
in SC1’s reasoning. Thus, SC1 rejects the gamble with which it is faced. The
same reasoning of course applies to SC2, SC3, and so on; that is, they all
reject the gambles with which they are faced. And this of course still holds
if we complicate the decision-problem with which each slice is faced by
including all the logically possible combinations of “Accept” and “Reject”
by other time-slices (i.e., by removing the simplifying assumption that the
“other” slices all act in the same way).
The implication of the above argument for the “time-extended” SC is
that if he acts instrumentally rationally at each point in time—that is, if
he always chooses in line with his preference—he will reject all the 100
gambles on offer. So, even though SC prefers accepting 100 gambles to
accepting no gamble, he will, by acting rationally at each point in time,
turn down every gamble.17
The above conclusion is reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons (Lloyd
1833), that is, the fact that individually rational players with a preference
structure like “late” time-slices of SC will, by acting instrumentally ra-
tionally, together cause an outcome that is worse, from their own point
of view, than an outcome that they (in theory) could ensure by acting
together.18 And just like the traditional interpersonal tragedy, the in-
trapersonal tragedy under discussion can be avoided by adopting some
system of “mutual coercion” (Hardin 1968). Two ways of implementing
such coercion seem particularly salient in the present context.
First, if SC could somehow turn his sequential choice problem into
a static one, then he could secure himself all 100 gambles without ever
17By analogous reasoning, we get a similar conclusion for a person who has a preference
in favour of the individual gamble but against the bundle of 100 gambles: Such a person
will accept each gamble, even if she takes the long-term perspective. Such a combination
of attitudes seems much less common than attitudes like SC’s. Moreover, such attitudes
also seem harder to rationalise than SC’s. For instance, it would be hard to rationalise
such attitudes by risk seekingness. After all, it is hard to understand why the risk seeking
would reject the bundle of 100 gambles.
18Kavka (1991) discussed intrapersonal, but synchronic, versions of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and concluded (as I do) that avoiding the tragic outcome is no less difficult
in the intrapersonal version of the game than in the traditional interpersonal game.
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acting irrationally (i.e., counter-preferentially). So, SC should be willing
to pay some price for turning the problem into one of choosing in one go
between a bundle consisting of 0 gambles and a bundle consisting of 100
gambles. Second, if SC could somehow remove the option to turn down
the gambles that he will later be offered, he would rationally choose to do
so. For instance, SC should be willing to pay someone to limit his options
in this way—much like Ulysses in Homer’s Odyssey ordered his crew to tie
him to the mast, thereby removing the option of leaving the ship.
However, if SC is really faced with the sequential choice problem, and
assuming that he is instrumentally rational, he will turn down each gamble
if he has that option. So, just like rational people in a multiperson Prisoner’s
Dilemma, a rational SC faces a sure tragedy: The tragedy of the risk averse.
5 Should SC be resolute?
Before concluding this paper, I shall briefly address the question of why,
unlike some defenders of alternatives to expected utility theory, I do not
assume that a rational SC is what is called a resolute chooser (McClennen
1990). To put it informally, a chooser is resolute, in this sense, if she decides
at the start of some sequential choice problem to implement a particular
plan, and chooses accordingly at every choice point, even if that means
choosing against her preference at some choice point(s). In the case of SC’s
sequential choice problem, the resolute choice could be to, for instance,
decide at the start of the sequence to accept all gambles, even though that
would require choosing counter-preferentially at some choice points.
Now, not being resolute makes decision-makers like SC—more gener-
ally, decision-makers who are not expected utility maximisers—vulnerable
to certain costs in sequential decision-problems. We have already seen in-
stances of this: If possible, SC will choose to pay a price to remove the
option of rejecting the gambles in the sequence. He will also willingly pay
a price for changing his sequential decision-problem into a one-off (i.e.,
static) decision. And note that this willingness to pay to affect the structure
of the decision-problem is not due to predicted weakness of the will or
preference change.
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SC thus differs from any expected utility maximiser, who will end
up with the same outcome irrespective of whether the decision-problem
is static or sequential (as long as the possible outcomes and the relevant
probabilities are the same), unless she suffers from weakness of will of some
sort or changes her mind during the sequence. Hence, such an expected
utility maximiser will neither pay a price to bind herself nor will she pay to
turn a sequential choice problem into a one-off decision. But neither would
a resolute SC, or so the argument goes, since he would simply resolve to
accept each gamble on offer, despite his preference.
For the above reasons, many defenders of alternatives to expected util-
ity theory—that is, people who think that preferences that violate the ax-
ioms of the theory can nevertheless be rational—have been tempted by
the view that rational people who are not expected utility maximisers are
resolute choosers (see e.g. McClennen 1990, Buchak 2013, Thoma 2017,
2019). I think that is a mistake: It can never be rational, at time t, to choose
against what one truly prefers, at time t; hence, a rational person will not
be a resolute chooser.19 In fact, I think that those who defend alternatives
to expected utility theory should simply accept that certain preferences are
such that an agent with those preferences can find herself in a situation
where she would get an outcome that is better, from her own point of
view, had she had different preferences. But that by itself does not give the
person a reason to change her preferences, assuming for instance that the
situation in question is sufficiently rare or unlikely to occur.20
That resolute choice is generally irrational is however not a claim that I
can hope to defend in this paper. Instead, I will simply point out that those
who think that SC should choose resolutely will, if the argument from the
last section is sound, have to accept a pretty radical implication.
As the reader will recall, I argued in the last section that SC faces a
noncooperative game. Granted, SC faces a game between different time-
19This is not to say that rational people cannot be what Wlodek Rabinowicz (1995)
calls wise choosers. That is, rational people may take into consideration past choices and
intentions, etc., in the sense of making them part of the description of the their current
options. But if such considerations alter a person’s attitude to a gamble, then that person
does not have a simple preference structure like SC.
20So, in my view, a person with cyclical preferences should not change her preferences
because she could otherwise (in theory) be money pumped.
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slices of himself, rather than with other people; and one’s relationship to
different time-slices of oneself may, in important ways, differ from one’s
relationship to other people. However, the difference in question, whatever
it may be, is irrelevant to the argument of this paper. Even though SC’s
relationship to other people differs in many respects from the relationship
between different time-slice of SC, the two relationships share an important
feature: One time-slice of SC cannot determinately choose for another
time-slice of SC, no more than SC can determinately choose for another
person. Nor can one time-slice count on some external force that ensures
that another time-slice “cooperates”. And that suffices to make the game
that each time-slices has to play a noncooperative game.
In light of the above, it is hard to see how it could be (instrumentally)
rational for SC to choose resolutely, unless it can be (instrumentally) ra-
tional for different players in an interpersonal noncooperative game, such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to choose resolutely. So, those who claim that
SC should be resolute, will, if my argument is sound, have to accept that
people facing some noncooperative games should be resolute. Occasional
scholars may be willing to accept that implication (in particular, McClen-
nen 1997 and Gauthier 1996). But I think that most of those who feel
tempted by the idea that those who are not expected utility maximisers
should be resolute in non-strategic sequential choice problems, will nev-
ertheless find it hard to accept that players in, say, a Prisoner’s Dilemma
should be resolute.
To conclude, there may be reasons to regret being risk averse. Most
obviously, the risk averse should expect to do worse in the long-run than
the risk neutral. However, doing worse than one would expect to do, had
one been different, does not make one irrational. In fact, the fate of the
risk averse is tragic precisely because by acting instrumentally rationally
they choose prospects that are worse, by their own lights ex ante, than the
prospects that they could have chosen.
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